Abstract-This paper presents a new policy language, known as functionality-based application confinement policy language (FBAC-PL). FBAC-PL takes a unique approach to expressing application-oriented access control policies. Policies for restricting applications are defined in terms of the features applications provide, by means of parameterised and hierarchical policy abstractions known as functionalities. Policies also include metadata for management and the automation of policy specification. The result is a novel scheme for application confinement policy that reuses, encapsulates and abstracts policy details, and facilitates a priori policy specification: that is, without having to rely solely on learning modes for creating policies to restrict applications. This paper presents the policy language, and illustrates its use with examples. A Linux-based implementation, which uses FBAC-PL, has demonstrated that this approach can overcome policy complexity and usability issues of previous schemes.
INTRODUCTION
Access controls are typically designed to protect resources from users. In these schemes each process is restricted based on its user identity, and treated as if it is acting on behalf of the user. However, this user-oriented approach is insufficient, as processes do not necessarily act in the best interest of users: for example, as is the case with malware and software vulnerabilities. Application-oriented access controls mitigate this threat by restricting the actions of each application.
Application-oriented schemes include isolation-based containers or sandboxes, such as chroot(), BSD Jails [1] , and Danali [2] . These schemes require duplicated and often redundant resources, and limit the sharing of resources between applications, which can interfere with natural workflows. Other rule-based schemes provide controls over shared resources allowing applications to access the same resources in a restricted manner. These schemes include TRON [3] , Systrace [4] , and domain and type enforcement (DTE) [5] . Two established security mechanisms that provide rule-based application-oriented access control on Linux are SELinux [6] and AppArmor (previously known as SubDomain) [7] . Due to policy complexity, these schemes typically rely on learning modes to generate policy. Arguably policy complexity and usability issues have limited the adoption of these schemes. This paper presents a new policy language, known as functionality-based application confinement policy language (FBAC-PL), that can overcome many of the policy complexity issues with previous finely-grained rule-based applicationoriented access controls, and can in many cases facilitate the creation of complete policies a priori: that is, without having to first run the program being confined. FBAC-PL was designed to express policies based on the functionality-based application confinement (FBAC) model [8, 9] . FBAC restricts programs in terms of the features they provide, using policy abstractions known as functionalities. Functionalities are hierarchical; that is, they can contain other functionalities for layers of abstraction and encapsulation. Functionalities are also parameterized, so that they can adapt to the specific needs of each application. A Linux security module (LSM)-based implementation, known as FBAC-LSM was developed, which represents policy using FBAC-PL 1 .
II. FBAC POLICY LANGUAGE OVERVIEW
FBAC-PL expresses functionality-based applicationoriented access control policies. FBAC-PL is a name-based policy language; that is, it authorises access based on the names of resources. FBAC-PL policy is centrally managed and can simultaneously specify mandatory and discretionary controls. Policies include access rules and metadata used for policy administration and automation.
FBAC-PL expresses FBAC policies in three different types of policy files:
• confinements, which specify the sets of application restrictions that apply to users and who is authorised to make changes to application policies; this defines the system wide configuration; • application policies, which specify how applications are identified and how they are restricted; and, • functionalities, which are used as modules for specifying application policies.
III. NAME-BASED PATTERN MATCHING
Two distinct approaches to access control mediation have emerged: label-based and name-based mediation. FBAC-PL and the FBAC-LSM implementation take a name-based approach. Using name-based mediation, resources are protected based on their names rather than via labels attached to objects. For example, access to files is mediated in terms of their pathnames rather than the labels associated with the files. Namebased protection provides the flexibility of centrally managed access control policy, as distinct from the management of files. Also, the needs of specific applications can be described in terms of resources that overlap with the needs of other applications, and policies can be defined by multiple users, without the overhead of managing multiple labels for each resource. For these reasons, FBAC is believed to be well suited to a namebased implementation. However, a label-based implementation (although more complex) would also be possible.
Resource descriptors in FBAC-PL take the form of simple patterns. Wildcard patterns provide support for describing multiple files, directories, IPv4 IPs, and ports using pattern matching techniques. Briefly, these patterns can describe resources in the following ways. Files and directories can have asterisks to match any valid characters in a pathname. "**" allows "/" to be included, which means that subdirectories can be included, while "*" does not. This is designed to be similar to AppArmor's wildcard file matching. IP matching is very simple where a direct IPv4 address can be used, or an octet can be replaced with an asterisk, which can represent any number. Ports can either be a particular number, all "*", or a range such as "6667-7000".
IV. SPECIFICATION KEY FBAC-PL is specified using Backus-Naur Form (BNF) [10] . BNF is a common method for describing programming language syntax and the format of files or information. Many variations of BNF exist. The specific style used here is a form of Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF), similar to that used in the XML standard published by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [11] , and is used as described below.
Policies are defined as sets of rules in the form: symbol ::= expression. Where the symbol is nonterminal (variable) and the expression is defined in terms of symbols or terminals (literal values). Literal values that appear in expressions are underlined and italicised. The '%' character represents a line feed. A '|' in an expression specifies an alternative valid value. Square brackets, '[' and ']', are used to group together parts of an expression to define the scope and precedence of alternatives and quantifiers. In EBNF, regular expression characters are used to denote quantification. The characters '*', '+' or '?' can follow groups, literals, or symbols. The '*' character specifies they can occur zero or more times, '+' indicates one or more times, and '?' indicates zero or one time. Symbols and literals in expressions are concatenated. Space and white space in policy is explicitly stated using the 's' or 'ws' symbols, which are defined within the specification.
V. FBAC-PL SPECIFICATION IN BNF
The specification of FBAC-PL using BNF is as follows: Although white space indicated by the symbol 'ws' is optional, a tab is recommended for policy readability. In addition, after optional white space, any lines beginning with a hash ('#') are ignored and can be used to comment policy. FBAC-LSM is not strict about the order of the elements in the conf_policy, func_policy, and app_policy expressions as specified above.
VI. CONFINEMENTS
The confinements policy is stored in the directory /etc/fbac-lsm in the file confinements.fbac. This file is maintained manually by an administrator and defines and configures all the sets of rules that apply to the users specified within the file. This file is the system-wide configuration file for the FBAC-LSM mechanism. Figure 1 demonstrates a possible confinements.fbac file. In this example one confinement is specified: a discretionary control. The discretionary control applies to the user whose user identity (uid) is 1000 (which in this case corresponds to the user 'cliffe') and is maintained by that same user. Using FBAC-PL, adding additional mandatory or discretionary controls that are simultaneously enforced is straightforward, they are configured in this file. 
VII. APPLICATION POLICIES
The policies for restricting applications are stored in the file or directory specified in a confinement policy. Users specified via the 'application_policies_maintained_by' value in a confinement are authorised to add, edit or remove these application policies. Users are not required to be familiar with the FBAC-PL syntax as they specify policy using the policy manager, a graphical tool that creates the FBAC-PL policy and writes the policy files on the behalf of authorised users. Users are not allowed direct access to the application policy files. Figure 2 shows an example application policy file, konversation.fbac, which was generated by the policy manager to restrict the application Konversation. Konversation is a graphical IRC client. The paths to its executables are specified, then the functionalities describing the security goals of the application are specified and parameterised. The three functionalities specified are Standard_Graphi-cal_Application, which is the base-level functionality describing the type of user interface, the Uses_Perl platform functionality, and the Irc_Chat_Client functionality. All three were automatically suggested by the policy manager based on the iconcategory specified in the konversation.desktop file and the application's dependencies. Functionalities for applications can also be specified manually by users based on their expectations of the features provided by applications.
The parameters specified for the Irc_Chat_Client functionality authorise Konversation to connect to any IRC server on the default IRC port, and save files to a download directory. As shown in Figure 2 , FBAC-LSM functionalities are passed arguments in a fashion similar to subroutines in programming languages. This allows the policy abstraction to easily adapt to the differing details of applications providing related features.
VIII. FUNCTIONALITIES
Functionalities are the building blocks of policy and are reused for multiple confinements and applications. Functionalities are stored in the source specified in the confinements.fbac file. The names functionalities use follow a naming convention, where high level and base functionalities use mixed case. For example, Web_Browser, and all lower level functionalities use all lower case, such as file_r. Figure 3 shows an example of a functionality that represents a high-level program feature, Irc_Chat_Client. As shown in the figure, functionalities can include additional information used by the policy manager to manage and automate application policy construction. In the figure, bold text denotes policy that can be enforced by the LSM, while the information in italics is metadata only used by the policy manager for management and automation. The definition starts with a description, and includes the "highlevel" directive to specify, for the policy manager, that it is a high-level functionality. This functionality is assigned a category, "network_client", which is used to group related functionalities to ease the process of selecting functionalities. As shown in the example, functionality suggestion directives can be used to specify attributes of applications that are likely to use this functionality. Given the presence of this example functionality, when creating a policy for an application, if the application has the "IRCClient" icon category specified in its '.desktop' file or it depends on the "python-irclib" library, the Irc_Chat_Client functionality is automatically suggested.
Parameters are also specified, which are used to adapt the functionality to the needs of specific applications. The definition of the parameter files also contains a default argument value that is used when the argument "<default>" is passed to a parameter. This is similar to a feature of programming languages such as Python, C++, and Windows PowerShell that enables subroutine parameters to have default values. This feature allows further abstraction in common cases without sacrificing flexibility. Parameters can also have methods for automating argument specification. For example, in the figure the line "parameter_automate usedefault" instructs the policy manager to use the default values when automating arguments. Other methods for automation of arguments exist, such as searching for directories matching patterns containing the application's name. The hierarchical containment relationship between functionalities enables arguments to propagate to contained functionalities. For example, when an application policy includes the Irc_Chat_Client functionality, the value for the chat_IRC_servers parameter is passed as an argument. If an IP address is specified in the application policy, the Irc_Chat_Client functionality will consequently only grant access to browse web resources on the named host. This is achieved as a result of this information propagating from functionality to contained functionality until the information is used in the definition of a privilege.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented an application-oriented access control policy language, known as FBAC-PL. FBAC-PL can express policies for restricting applications based on the features they provide, and encapsulates policy details using reusable parameterised abstractions. FBAC-PL can include metadata that facilitates automation that is not available in other existing schemes. A Linux-based implementation, FBAC-LSM, has demonstrated the advantages of this new policy language. This new approach to policy poses unique opportunities to further improve the usability of application-oriented access controls.
